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Social Network, Intra-network Education Spillover Effect and Rural-urban 
Migrant Wages: Evidence from China 
 ABSTRACT：This study examines the determinants of rural-urban migrant wages, paying 
special attention to the intra-network education spillover effect of the migrants’ social 
network in China. Using the new migrant sample of Rural Urban Migration in China 
(RUMiC) 2009 survey data, we find that the migrants’ social network does have a significant 
impact on their own earnings. In particular, we find evidence that there exists an education 
spillover effect of the migrants’ social network, which indicates that the education level of the 
migrants’ social network has a significant positive effect on their earnings. We also find that 
the education spillover effects differ with gender. The results are robust after considering the 
potential problem of endogeneity. 
 
Key words: Social network; Education spillover effect; Earnings of rural-urban migrants 
JEL classification: J61, O15, R23 
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1. Introduction 
Social networks play an important role in an individual’s occupational turnover, wage 
premium and job access as shown by research in developed economies (Calvo-Armengol and 
Jackson, 2004, 2007; Loury, 2006; Caliendo et al., 2010; Cingano and Rosolia, 2012; 
Schmutte, 2015). During the past decades of urbanization in China, social networks (called 
“Guanxi” in Chinese) have become an important resource to migrants in job seeking, income 
upgrading, and integration (Bian, 1994; Zhang and Li, 2003; Wang et al., 2014; Wang et al., 
forthcoming). The Chinese hukou system that does not allow free labor mobility makes a 
natural social network in a village (Vendryes, 2011). Since the 1980s, these social networks 
have helped Chinese farmers who have migrated to the city seeking non-agriculture jobs. 
Existing research has documented the direct influence (offering information, providing 
financial aid, recommending a job) of the social network on migrant wages (Mortensen and 
Vishwanath, 1994; Bian, 1997; Lin, 1999; Ye and Zhou, 2010; Caliendo et al., 2010; Dong, 
Huang and Tang, 2014; Wang et al., forthcoming). More work needs to be done on the 
indirect influence such as social learning/network spillover effects. 
This paper studies the intra-network education spillover effect1 among closely related 
migrant workers to examine whether there exists a human capital externality among a 
migrant’s social networks. Using rural migrant worker sample data in the 2009 Rural Urban 
Migration in China (RUMiC) survey, the paper makes an overall inspection of the roles that 
                                                             
1 Generally, peer effect is divided into two categories: endogenous effect (outcome to outcome) and exogenous effect 
(endowment to outcome). Most previous research (Fitzgerald et al., 2012; Burke and Sass, 2013; Sacerdote, 2001) focus on 
the outcome to outcome effect (someone may be influenced by a peer’s behavior or achievement); however, fewer studies 
(Calvo Armengol et al., 2009) pay attention on the endowment to outcome effect (a peer’s attributes may affect someone’s 
own achievement). This paper mainly refers to the latter one including peers among individuals’ closely related persons. 
However, this paper focuses on the individuals’ closely related persons that differs from typical peers in relationships 
although the two cohorts have overlapping contents. 
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social networks play on the wage increase of migrant workers. In particular, we study the 
intra-network education spillover effects within the social network represented by the three 
closest related persons. We find that social network members have substantial direct effects 
on the wage increment of migrant workers, which can be divided into direct influence such as 
monetary help, and indirect influence such as social learning or spillover effect. Furthermore, 
we also find that the social network of migrant workers has significant human capital 
externality on their monthly wages. That is, those whose closest related persons have a higher 
education level tend to get higher wages, and this effect significantly differs with gender. 
Our paper differs from the existing research in several ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first one focusing on intra-social network education spillover 
effect in China using micro-level data. We use the attribute-outcome network effects that 
focus on the intra-network human capital externality spillover effect. This differs from 
previous research that mostly focused on outcome-outcome peer effects (Moretti, 2002, 2004; 
Sousa, 2013; Liu 2008; Angrist, 2014). Our model setup avoids potential spurious results due 
to endogenous issues because the related person’s education is determined by his own family 
background and not affected by migrant income. Second, the detailed micro survey data set 
on rural to urban migrants allows us to further study the mechanism of how this network on 
human capital externality works. We find the direct channel through which a migrant’s social 
network may influence their economic outcome. More importantly, we find the indirect effect, 
such as social learning spillover, where interpersonal communication usually leads to 
information, knowledge and benefit exchange within the social relations network. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first review the related literature in section 2. 
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Section 3 presents the data and descriptive statistics results. Section 4 introduces the 
empirical framework. Section 5 carries out the empirical results, conducts the robustness 
inspection, and then gives further evidence for the mechanism analysis. The conclusion 
follows in the final section. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Social network 
The social network is referred to as “weak ties" through which information transfer plays 
an important role in the process of job hunting (Granovetter, 1973). 2 Granovetter (1985) 
further points out those human economic activities are embedded in the social network, and 
Lin (1999) defines these embedded resources in social network as social capital. Based on 
previous network theory, Bian (1997) calls the social network “strong ties” that play a vital 
role on the income of network parties. 
Some research has shown that the social network plays an important role in the 
decision-making, economic returns and other aspects through social resource, social rule and 
social impact. Lin (1999, 2008) studies the direct causal effects of the social network from 
the angle of social resources strategies. From the perspective of social rules, Coleman (1988) 
and Putnam (1995) emphasize that the social network is a specific structural organization that 
regulates individuals in specific network architecture, and produces some peer pressure on 
the members within that network. Furthermore, peer pressure can result in incentives to 
network members. Social learning mainly comes from the spillover effect of human capital 
among the interior network members. Through familiarity, individuals are more likely to 
                                                             
2 Social network can be broadly categorized into “weak ties” and “strong ties”. However, Granovetter (1973) highlighted 
the importance of weak ties, hence, the definition of social network usually can be narrowed into “weak ties” accordingly. 
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work hard and thus the spillover effect on other internal personnel within the social network 
improves the productivity of the related parties and thus increases income. 
The literature provides diverse ways for us to understand how social networks function. 
However, it is a challenge for researchers to define the structure and size of the social 
network accurately. A key concept of an individual’s social network is that the closest 
relationships play important roles in their behaviors. Therefore, in this paper, we regard the 
closest related persons as the representatives to analyze the possible impact on individual 
income payment. 
2.2. The education spillover effect 
Previous literature has shown positive education spillover effect. Moretti (2004) indicates 
that overall education levels of citizens are able to cause positive spillover effects to 
individuals. Using the community data, Sousa (2013) finds that the average level of education 
in the immigrant community has a positive effect on the individual's self-employment. Using 
data at the enterprise level, Battu et al. (2003) and Moretti (2002) find that the average 
education level of the workers has a positive impact on the productivity of individual workers. 
These studies find that the overall education levels of the residents in cities and workforces 
within the same enterprise help to increase the productivity and then affect their income 
outcomes. In that case, are there any similar education spillover effects at the individual level 
not only from peers but also from the social network? Furthermore, the research on peer 
effect in relevant literature shows that the peer cohort does affect their individual behaviors 
and economic returns in many aspects. However, the individual’s social network from the 
peer effect is not exactly equal to its cohort (i.e. one’s friend may not live or work together 
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with him/her). Thus, besides the impact of information transfer and direct help from the 
social network, is there any indirect intrinsic pathway that has an impact on the individuals?  
Our paper examines the above issues by emphasizing the intra-network education 
spillover effects. Along with previous studies, we find that the impact on the individual's 
social network analysis mainly focuses on the level of resource provision and reciprocal help. 
In particular, some close friends from a long distance but communicating frequently, may 
have an education spillover effect. As mentioned in the introduction, Chinese society features 
a "human society" and "relational society", and this type of "relation" is a central element in 
daily economic activities, especially in rural areas and in migrant communities. The majority 
of migrant workers follow their relatives or fellow villagers when leaving rural areas to work 
in cities. They are more inclined to be social with people from their home village/province. 
This kind of social relation, either on the household level or village level, has a great impact 
on the migrant’s employment or earnings in the city. Therefore, the study of social network 
effects requires the combination of the migrant’s own characteristics and that of their closely 
related persons. Our analysis relating the individual’s level of education with their income is 
not yet included in the literature. 
The education spillover effect potentially comes from two channels in the social network. 
One is from social learning within a specific social network. Chinese rural-urban migrant 
workers usually work in similar industries and workplaces because of their homogeneity of 
skill and education levels. In this case, migrants are more likely to learn skills from their 
village friends. Social learning is a significant channel to improve workers’ skills and thus 
productivity, resulting in increased income. The other channel is most likely from social 
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impact in the long run. This impact results from gradual contagious connections (some 
research also calls it peer effect) within the social network. If a related person has a relatively 
higher level of education, they are more likely to disseminate efficient information or 
knowledge to other members of the network. This may affect an individual’s skill level in the 
long term. 
The next two sections empirically study the migrant’s social network influence, especially 
the intra-spillover effect that is based on the education level of the closest relatives, friends or 
peers. In the regression analysis, we analyze the impact that social network’s quantity has on 
migrants’ wages. We then focus on the quality, exploring the intra-network educational 
spillover effects among the migrant’s social network. 
3. Data 
The data are from the RUMIC survey (2009), conducted by the Australian National 
University, Beijing Normal University and the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). We 
focus on the new samples of the migrant families in 2009, which were selected from the 
sampling frame designed by the group. It covers nine provinces and 15 cities, both urban and 
the rural, including Shanghai (the main metropolitan), Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Dongguan 
(eastern areas of Guangdong province), Nanjing and Wuxi (eastern areas of Jiangsu), 
Hangzhou and Ningbo (eastern areas of Zhejiang), Wuhan (central area of Hubei province), 
Hefei and Bengbu（central areas of Anhui), Zhengzhou and Luoyang (central areas of Henan), 
Chongqing (western area) as well as Chengdu (central area of Sichuan). The majority of the 
floating population in China is integrated into the above cities (the designs and investigation 
details of the floating population sampling frame can refer to Kong (2010).  
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The original data contain 3,422 migrant families. We select only the individual’s (the head 
of household) answers to the questionnaires for this study, since we are concentrating on 
migrant workers rather than migrant families. After dropping missing data of the main 
variables, we get a common sample with 2,828 observations. We further drop six 
observations that have a local urban household registration, and 15 that have a non-local 
urban household registration. We focus on rural-urban migrants in this study, so we only keep 
individuals who have a rural hukou and thus drop an additional 21 observations that have 
non-rural household registration. Finally, we have 2,807 observations of migrant workers in 
this research. 
The questionnaire mainly investigates migrant worker information on workers aged 16 
and above including personal basic information (i.e. sex, age, marital status, education level 
and training), employment information (i.e. working time, occupational experience, if 
changed jobs after working outside of the rural, average monthly wage income, current work 
unit properties, current working industry, city, job, etc.), as well as the social interaction (i.e. 
the number of people greeted in the Chinese New Year, the basic information of the person 
who was closest to their family or did favors for them during the past year). 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics analysis of migrant workers in our sample that 
involves their individual basic characteristics, human capital, employment information and 
social interaction. As we can see, the average monthly income is about 1,805 Chinese Yuan, 
which contains the various bonuses and subsidies to rural migrant workers but excludes the 
wages earned from their part-time job or other channels. What we need to point out is that the 
salary has not been adjusted for possible offered meals and accommodation by the employers. 
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The migrant workers have to spend a portion of their income on housing and daily meals due 
to sustainable living and working, and this ratio of spending may vary among migrant 
workers. Therefore, we control for this by adding a dummy variable that denotes whether 
meals or accommodation is offered. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
The social network section in Table 1 summarizes four alternative measurements for 
migrant’s social network: the total number of persons who were greeted by a single migrant, 
the number of greeted relatives, the number of greeted friends and the number of greeted 
people who have performed a favor for the migrant in the past year. These measurements go 
beyond the previous literature that use the number of persons who were greeted by a single 
migrant in the Chinese New Year to represent the magnitude of one’s social network. As we 
can see, on average, each migrant greeted approximately 23 persons, among which both 
relatives and friends account for nearly a half (the number of greeted relatives is 11 while 
greeted friends is 13). When we turn to the helpers’ effects, the number is reduced to four. 
However, the above processing cannot represent the social network thoroughly and thus 
cannot reflect how social network members help each individual.  
Therefore, we further adopt a nominative approach that is a widely used survey method in 
the field of social network to measure one’s network using the closest persons. In the survey, 
five people are nominated by “who gave you a direct help on your work and daily life or who 
has the closest relationship with you in the past one year”, and the five nominees are ranked 
according to the relative importance by the nomination. By using this nominative method, 
some key information is easily accessible for the five relevant persons such as basic personal 
10 
 
characteristics information, education, work status, residence, etc. And, most importantly, the 
interactions between the migrant and his/her five closest related persons are also available. 
Due to missing data for the fourth and fifth person in the related network, we only use the 
closest three persons to represent a migrant’s specific social network in order to conduct our 
investigation. 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the three closest persons of the migrant 
worker. We find that the three closest persons are mainly friends (close to 50%) and relatives 
(about 30%). As to the help that a related person gave to the migrant worker, 90 percent of 
received help from their three closest persons, while only 10 percent did not. Seventy percent 
of the help was indirect help such as spiritual and/or psychological in nature, while a smaller 
proportion of help was direct help, such as money and gifts. On the other hand, from the 
education and residence condition of the three closest persons, their average education level 
is almost at the same level as the migrant worker (the majority are in the junior school 
graduate level), while more than half of the related persons live near the migrant worker and 
a smaller proportion of related persons live far away, in rural areas or other provinces. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
In order to study the education spillover effect of the migrant worker’s social network, we 
take the years of education gap between the three closest persons and the migrant worker as 
the key independent variable.3 The descriptive statistics data suggest that, there are minor 
differences between the education level of the three closest related persons and the migrant 
worker. On average, the related person’s years of education are greater than that of the 
                                                             
3 Actually, the coefficients of using the education gap between the migrant and his/her closest related person or just using 
the closest related person’s education are the same when the migrant’s education is controlled. However, in order to exhibit 
the spillover effect, we still use the “gap” term in the empirical section. 
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individual migrant worker. The following section makes a concrete estimate as to the 
intra-network education spillover effect among the social network represented by the three 
closest related persons of the migrant worker. 
4. Econometric Methodology 
The econometric model follows the extended mincer model in the literature (Manski, 
1993). We use different key independent variables to denote the quantity and quality of a 
migrant’s social network in the specifications. First, a simple regression is run to check the 
social network’s influence on income by using the number of the migrant’s relatives, friends 
and helpers, which are often used in the social network literature. Then we proxy a migrant’s 
social network’s quality as their three closest related persons’ education levels to seek 
evidence on whether there exists a human capital externality among the migrant’s social 
network. That is: 
1 1 1 2 2 1
ln X Xin c o m e                               （1） 
2 1 1 2 2 3 1 2
ln X X Sin c o m e                           （2） 
3 1 1 2 2 3 2 3
ln X X Sin c o m e                           （3） 
Equation (1) is the classic wage regression model in which the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of the monthly wage income of the migrants. X1 is the vector of a migrant’s 
individual characteristics including age, gender, marital status, education level and health 
state. Vector X2 represents migrant’s work-related characteristics such as working experience, 
whether training was received, working hours, current occupation, working city, and whether 
offered meals and accommodation, etc. Equation (2) adds a vector S1 that denotes the 
individual’s total social network, which is the number of people to whom a migrant sent 
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greetings to in the last Chinese New Year, including relatives, friends and those from whom a 
migrant received help. Specifically, we focus on the third equation for substituting vector S1 
with S2, which is the three closest persons to the migrant to represent their social network. We 
use the education gap between these three persons and that of the migrant to measure the 
intra-social network educational spillover effect which may exist within a migrant’s social 
network. 
Our model setup has some advantages over other literature in social network that often 
encounter an endogenous problem. First, the social network of the individual is defined as 
friends who are not other observations in the regression. That is, each observation in the 
regression reports three friends who are not other observations in the regression. This avoids 
the situation of a traditional peer effect where each individual that we consider comes from 
the group observations, which leads to an endogenous issue as the same people whose 
outcome showed up on the left-hand side of the equation also showed up on the right-hand 
side as part of someone else's network.   
Second, our model is set up from attribute (education) to the outcome (income) and this 
differs from most previous research (Liu, 2008; Han and Li, 2009; Giacomo and Michele, 
2013) that examines an individual’s social network outcome, such as a peer’s economic 
attainment, on his economic attainment (outcome-on-outcome). A migrant’s social network 
may influence his/her outcome and a migrant’s outcome may also have a reflective impact on 
his/her social network, the so called reflection problem by Manski (1993) and Angrist (2014). 
As Angrist (2014) denotes, the outcome-on-outcome peer effect is vacuous due to the 
endogenous issue. Hence, we try investigating the social network spillover effect by focusing 
13 
 
on the endowment-to-outcome model. Here we address a migrant’s closest related persons’ 
human capital levels, instead of their economic or social outcomes. We argue that one’s 
friends’ or relatives’ education levels cannot be influenced by their friends or relatives, it’s a 
predetermined attribute.4 
However, our methodology faces a selection problem. As we discussed above, migrants 
cannot influence their social networks’ human capital level, but they can choose their friends. 
We tackle this selectivity in two ways that are commonly used in micro-econometrics. First, 
we do a propensity score matching analysis based on a migrant’s observable characteristics. 
By doing so we can solve the selectivity problem caused by observable attributes. Second, 
there may be some unobservable attributes or endowments, so we conduct IV estimation by 
finding three valid instrument variables for the endogenous gap. We use migrant’s school 
performance, the admission age for primary school, and the proportion of migrant workers in 
the hometown to instrument the gap term.5 By doing so, we eliminate the problem of 
selectivity and endogeneity.  
5. Results 
5.1 The direct effect of social network on the monthly income 
Table 3 presents the OLS estimate results. Column (1) estimates from the classic Mincer 
wage model that focuses on the return of education, training and working experience. 
Column (2) reports the estimation results from an extended Mincer wage model by adding 
                                                             
4 Some may argue that a friend’s education are not exogenous, for if their friendship/relationship forms before they come to 
work, a friend’s study choice may be affected by his/her choice. Here we think this situation does exist, however it may not 
influence our analysis: we are aiming at estimating the intra-network education spillover effect among the migrant’s social 
network, and we hope for a bigger gap between the migrant and his/her related person; the bigger the gap is, the better the 
results are. Therefore, the existence of the situation mentioned above may lead to a smaller gap, in this perspective, it does 
no harm to our later result concerning the impact of education gap between the two related persons. We still cautiously use 
IV to solve this problem for an unbiased result though this problem does not seem serious. 
5 We instrument gap1, gap2 and gap3 with the same instruments, respectively, in the empirical section. 
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work-related variables. Column (3) further controls occupation based on the model in column 
(2). As we can see, a migrant’s age, years of education, health state, tenure and working hours 
per week are all having a positive significant effect on monthly income. The results also show 
that males significantly earn more than females. These findings are consistent with existing 
literature (Zhang and Li, 2003; Ye and Zhou, 2010; Wang et al., 2014). Most of the 
rural-to-urban migrants do not have a high education background and no more than half of 
them participated in a training program.6 Thus, they are engaged in low-skilled activity and 
income heavily depends on their health state and weekly working time.    
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Columns (4)–(6) consider the social network’s effect. The total number of persons that a 
migrant greeted within the last Chinese New Year has a positive effect on monthly income 
but not significant. While the number of greeted relatives does not have a significant impact 
on income, the number of friends and helpers effect are both significant and positive. We 
further divide the sample into sub-samples to run two separate regressions. Column (7) 
reports the results of the sub-sample where the migrant found his current job through the 
social network (i.e., offering job information, introducing a job) while column (8) presents 
the results of the sub-sample where the migrant found jobs by themselves. The results show 
that to those who find a job through the social network, the impact of the total number of 
greeted persons’ on income is significant, while to those who find their job by themselves, the 
total number of greeting persons’ impact on income is not significant. In other words, the 
quantitative effect of the social network only shows up through a direct channel, like offering 
                                                             
6 Table 1 shows the mean years of education at only 9.59. 
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information, introducing a job, etc. However, there may be some potential qualitative effect 
of the social network that we cannot observe, like the intra-network education spillover 
effect. 
5.2 The intra-network education spillover effect on the monthly income 
This section exams the education spillover effect by conducting the regression of 
education gap between the three related persons and the migrant on migrant monthly income. 
Previous empirical analyses indicate that there is a social network effect on income. However 
social network is a structure more than a resource (Lin, 2008), and how it influences an 
individual is through multiple channels and may be complicated. By using the migrant’s three 
closest related persons, we run the regression on the education gap between the migrant and 
each of them first, and then on the average gap of the three to see whether there exists an 
intra-social network educational spillover effect. The reason that we use the education gap 
instead of the three persons’ education is that a self-selection problem may exist. Though the 
self-selective bias cannot be solved completely, the gap variable is more random than the 
related person’s education itself.7  
Table 4 reports the regression results. Columns (1)-(3) in Table 4 indicate that the 
education gap between each of the three closest persons and the migrant has a positive 
significant effect on monthly income. Column (4) presents the estimates of the effect of the 
average education gap on monthly income and the result indicates a significant positive effect 
on a migrant's monthly income. To get a robust result we also consider the education phase 
                                                             
7 As for the possible multicollinearity between the education gap and the migrant’s education, we need not to care too much 
about for two reasons. First, based on John Fox (1991), the multicollinearity only affects the significance of the results but 
the estimates are also unbiased. Second, we do a VIF test for the regression and we find that a strong multicollinearity of gap 
and education doesn’t exist (the mean VIF coefficient if 5.06 and the VIF coefficient of gap1 and education are 1.25 and 
1.73, respectively). 
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rather than years of education. There are four phases (i.e., primary schooling, middle 
schooling, high schooling, and college schooling) of education experience. Variable average2 
represents the gap of education phase between the three closest persons and the migrant. The 
results are consistent with the previous finding that a migrant’s social network does have a 
human capital externality to their monthly wages. The results add new micro evidence on 
human capital externality at the macro level (Moretti. 2004; Sousa, 2013). In the next section, 
we look at how the social network effect differs with gender.   
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
5.3 Gender differences of intra-network education spillover effect 
This section tests whether a gender difference exists in a migrant’s intra-network spillover 
effect. The male and female usually show different properties in many ways such as risk 
taking (Charness and Gneezy, 2012), return to education (Li, 2003) and peer influence (Han 
and Li, 2009). Table 5 presents the regression results for male and female migrants 
respectively.8 This spillover effect tends to be more significant for males than for females. 
The results contradict previous findings that returns to education for women are higher than 
for men (Han and Li, 2009, Li, 2003). However, the two types of effects differ in impact 
mechanisms. The spillover effect we emphasize here lies in social learning. Since education 
spillover effects come from relatively long-run learning, the female migrants are more 
cautious in connecting with friends outside of their hometowns than males (Charness and 
Gneezy, 2012).  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
                                                             
8 Only the estimates of key variables, say, gap1, gap2 and gap3 are presented in Table 5, and other control variables that 
appear in Table 4 are also controlled. 
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5.4 Endogeneity test 
5.4.1 Propensity score matching: considering the selection problem  
The potential problem with the above econometric analysis is twofold. The first issue is 
the reflection problem or two-way causality, i.e., a migrant’s social network may influence 
their outcome and a migrant’s outcome may also have reflective impact on their social 
network. In this study, we use the migrant’s social network attributes but not the outcomes, to 
exam the intra-network education spillover. This relieves the problem of outcome-outcome 
two-way causality as the major formation of one’s social network based on education in 
school that happened before earning a wage. The second issue is the self-selection problem 
based on observable or unobservable characteristics. It is possible that people who earn a 
high income tend to make friends with those whom earn a high income or have a high level 
of education. We therefore use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method to deal with 
this.  
The PSM method was first developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and we apply this 
method to tackle the possible self-selection problem in our study. First, a Propensity Score 
(PS) is calculated that measures the extent of matching of the treatment group and the control 
group in multi-dimensions. The treated groups are those where the related person’s education 
level is higher than the migrant’s (the education gap is greater than 0), while the control 
groups are others. The formation of friendship may be based on life experience (education 
experiences and working experiences) and character attributes (characters). Migrant workers 
may choose friends based on observable characteristics (i.e., age, gender, marital status, 
education, occupation, etc.) and on unobservable characteristics (disposition, habit, etc.). 
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Thus, we do the match by considering both observable characteristics and proxies of the 
unobservable characteristics. The observable characteristics include age, gender, marital 
status, education background, working experience and occupation. The unobservable 
characteristics use the proxies such as personality (extrovert or introvert), risk taking, 
willpower (feel that can overcome the difficulties) and trust (feel that most people are 
trustable). We use three widely used methods that are Nearest-Neighbor Matching, Radius 
Matching and Kernel Matching.9  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
The results are presented in Table 6. The ATT values mean the average effect of treatment 
on the treated. A positive ATT means that the migrant’s related person’s education is higher 
than himself, otherwise ATT is negative. Most ATT values are positive, which implies that, 
after controlling for the problem of self-selection, there exists intra-network education 
spillover of a migrant’s social network. 
5.4.2 IV estimation 
This section conducts a robust test for the potential unobservable attributes that may 
correlate to the individuals’ selection of related persons. The previous section uses the PSM 
method that can help to identify the spillover effect. However, it cannot get an accurate 
coefficient of the spillover effect as it cannot tackle the problem of treatment effects. 
Therefore, in this section, we use the instrumental variables approach to further mitigate the 
potential omitted variable bias that may arise from unobserved factors being correlated with 
the selection. The IV approach allows us to obtain consistent estimates when the education 
                                                             
9 The ATT values for pre-treated and the matching test results are not presented in table 6. As for the matching test, most 
variables’ bias values after matching are below 5 while a very few variables are not (variable experience is 10.3). 
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gap is endogenous or measured with errors.  
The IVs that we use are a migrant worker’s school performance, admission age of 
primary school and the proportion of migrant workers in the home village. These variables 
are exogenous to the dependent variable, but are closely related to the endogenous 
independent variables. The high education school performance could affect the person’s 
income, however the majority of rural-to-urban migrants work in low-skilled industries, 
which is not relevant to their school performance prior to working. Meanwhile, those well 
performing students always tend to make friends with those with good performance as well. 
Admission age of primary school should have no correlation with one’s earning but it may 
affect the education gap between a migrant and his peers.10 Finally, the proportion of migrant 
workers in the hometown is exogenous to the monthly income of the migrant. Liu (2008) 
finds that in rural areas human capital externalities have a discouraging effect on rural-urban 
migration, which shows evidence that the rural area’s ratio of migrants is negatively 
correlated with its average human capital level. In other words, if the migrant comes from a 
rural area, his formal education level has a larger probability of being lower than his related 
person. Therefore, the migration ratio of the migrant’s home countryside is exogenous to a 
migrant’s monthly income, but may correlate with the gap between the migrant and his 
related person. 
In summary, we believe the three instruments we chose are valid and can help to identify 
the setting. Table 7 reports IV regression results. The results indicate that, everything else 
being equal, the larger the gap between the migrant and their related person, the higher the 
                                                             
10 For example, if one goes to primary school at seven, one year later than normal, his peers at the same age may be in high 
school when he is just graduating from primary. This increases the education gap between the migrant and his peers. 
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monthly wage the migrant will earn. The F statistics of the first stage of each regression are 
all above 10, indicating that the instruments pass the weak instrument test and the Sargan 
statistics of over identification test shows that the setting is not over identified.   
5.5 Some further findings about the influential mechanism 
The previous section documented robust evidence that an intra-network education 
spillover effect of a migrant’s social network exists. This section further investigates the 
channels that the social network effects on the related persons. As we discussed in Table 3, 
the channels could be a direct help such as monetary or other indirect influence such as 
human capital spillover. To do so, we divide the sample into several sub-samples by the type 
of relationship (relative vs. non-relative), the type of help (psychological vs. monetary), the 
distance (near vs. far) and the type of contact frequency (frequent vs. not frequent). 
Table 8 presents the results of sub-sample regressions by relatives and non-relatives. 
Three closest related persons mainly consist of relatives and friends, and we thus divide them 
into relative vs., non-relative. The results indicate that the education spillover effect is more 
significant among the non-relative network than that of the relative network. However, when 
looking into some detailed descriptive statistics about a migrant’s three related persons, we 
find that (1) a migrant tends to communicate with his relatives network through the financial 
channel, while interacting with the non-relatives network through the emotional 
perspective; 11  and (2) most of the relatives live in the countryside while most of 
non-relatives live in the same city or same community.12 This indicates that the significant 
differences may not come from the differences of relatives or nonrelatives, but may be caused 
                                                             
11 59.3% relatives offered psychological help to the migrant while 74.19% nonrelatives offered psychological help during 
the past year. 
12 30.22% relatives live in the countryside while only 10.53% nonrelatives live in the countryside. 
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by ways of interaction. Thus, we do another three regressions to get the evidence.  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
Table 9 reports the results by the type of help the migrant received. The results indicate 
that the intra-network education spillover effect is only significant when the migrant received 
psychological help, which denotes that the spillover effect relies on this kind of mental 
communication, not through monetary help. Table 10 presents the estimates that whether the 
living distance to related person affects the spillover effect. “Live near” means that the related 
person lives in the same city or community while “live far away” means that the related 
person lives in the countryside or other province (see Table 10). The regression results 
indicate that the intra-spillover effect is significant only when the related person lives not far 
away from the migrant. Table 11 presents the estimates that whether the frequency of the 
migrant contact to the related person affects the spillover effect. We define the contact 
“frequently” if the migrant contacts his related person every day or at least one time each 
month. We define “not frequently” if the migrant does not contact the related person in a year 
or longer. The results show that gap effect is only significant among migrants who contact 
their related person frequently. 
[Insert Table 9 around here]  
[Insert Table 10 around here] 
[Insert Table 11 around here] 
In sum, the intra-network education spillover effect does exist among migrants who are 
living and working closer, interacting more frequently and deeply with their social network 
members. Direct help like offering information or introducing a job may increase the 
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migrant’s economic attainment, but this influence is instant and one-time and this influence 
does not need a long time live-together social network. However, social learning needs more 
time and more interaction. Thus the results in Table 8 through Table 11 adds further evidence 
that apart from the direct influences, there does exist intra-network education spillover effect 
among the migrant’s social network. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper presents the social network spillover effect on an individual’s monthly income. 
The intra-network is represented by the three closest related persons of the migrant. Using 
micro-level survey data, we find that (1) a migrant worker’s social network’s higher 
education is beneficial to their economic earnings, (2) there does exist an intra-network 
education spillover effect among a migrant worker’s social network, and (3) the intra-network 
education spillover effect is more significant for males than females.  
We further exam the channels of this intra-network education spillover effect. The 
evidence shows that the related person’s education level for those who have a frequent 
relationship with the individual migrant worker has a positive spillover effect on the migrant 
worker’s income. In addition, the spillover effect of education is correlated with the specific 
communication process between migrant workers and their interacting persons: this spillover 
effect will be more significant when migrant workers have a closer social distance13 and 
physical distance, as well as psychological or spiritual communication. Compared with the 
direct effect, this inner effect based on spiritual interaction probably can improve the 
productivity of migrant workers in the long time, and thus increase their earnings. 
                                                             
13 There are different meanings about “social distance” in diverse research fields, here we define it as the frequency of 
interaction between migrants and their related persons, relative to “physical distance”. 
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Table 1 
Definition of variables and summary statistics 
 
Definition Mean(standard 
deviation) 
Dependent variable   
Monthly income 
Total monthly income, including pension and bonus but excluding part-job 
earnings(yuan) 
1805 (2090) 
Lincome (Log month income) Natural logarithm of monthly income 7.34 (0.51) 
   
Social network    
Persons Number of total persons greeted in Chinese Spring Festival in various ways 23.8 (25.1) 
Relatives Number of relatives among the total persons 10.7 (11.5) 
Friends Number of friends among the total persons 12.6 (17.4) 
Helpers Number of people who had helped you in the past 12 months among the total persons 3.7 (5.1) 
Average education Average education of the three closest relation persons in the past 12 months 9.67 (2.63) 
   
Individual characteristics   
Education Years of education 9.59 (2.55) 
College =1 for college graduates and above, =0 for others 0.075 (0.26) 
High school =1 for high school graduates including vocation high school, =0 for others 0.32 (0.47) 
Middle school =1 for middle school graduates, =0 for others 0.50 (0.50) 
Primary school =1 for primary school graduates, =0 for others 0.10 (0.30) 
Age Age in years 29.8 (10.1) 
Male =1 for males, =0 for females 0.66 (0.47) 
Married =1 for whom married, =0 for whom unmarried 0.49 (0.50) 
Health Varies from 1 to 5 which 1 means has poor health and 5 means has excellent health 4.19 (0.73) 
Performance Varies from 1 to 5 which 1 means the worst and 5 means the best 3.21 (0.70) 
Personality =1 for those relatively extroversive, =0 for those relatively introversive 0.33 (0.47) 
   
Work-related characteristics   
Turnover =1 for those have changed work since coming out, =0 for those are not 0.38 (0.49) 
Work time  Average work time in a week(hour) 60.70 (16.22) 
Training =1 for those received training, =0 for those not 0.29 (0.45) 
Tenure Working years for primary job 4.39 (4.36) 
Experience Years since coming out 8.73 (6.68) 
Self-employed =1 for those who are self-employed, =0 for those are not 0.18 (0.38) 
Note: 1.Some dummy variables which are also very important are not listed above. They are Occupation, Catering, Accommodation, City, Company 
size. 
2. Data source: RUMiC 2009. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of three closest relation persons 
 Definitions Descriptive Statistics 
Relationship    
Relationship1 Relationship with relation person 1 Relatives (33.6%), Friends (47.7%), Others (18.7%) 
Relationship2 Relationship with relation person 2 Relatives (31.0%), Friends (47.8%), Others (21.2%) 
Relationship3 Relationship with relation person 3 Relatives (27.6%), Friends (48.4%), Others (12.0%) 
   
Interaction   
Type of help1 
Received what kind of help from person 1 Financial (31.92%), Psychological (69.32%), Daily affairs (11.71%), No 
help (4.32%) 
Type of help2 
Received what kind of help from person 2 Financial (34.62%), Psychological (73.64%), Daily affairs (10.68%), No 
help (4.66%) 
Type of help3 
Received what kind of help from person 3 Financial (21.45%), Psychological (70.38%), Daily affairs (10.40%), No 
help (7.34%) 
Frequency1 Frequency of contact with person 1 At least once a week (63.48%), At least once a month (57.75%), At least 
once a year (6.69%), Hardly ever (0.57%) 
Frequency2  Frequency of contact with person 2 At least once a week (57.75%), At least once a month (34.49%), At least 
once a year (7.10%), Hardly ever (0.65%) 
Frequency3 Frequency of contact with person 3 At least once a week (56.44%), At least once a month (33.17%), At least 
once a year (9.65%), Hardly ever (0.74%) 
Moneyout1 Money/gifts/banquet given to person 1 Yes (30.6%), No (69.4%) 
Moneyout2 Money/gifts/banquet given to person 2 Yes (26.6%), No (73.4%) 
Moneyout3 Money/gifts/banquet given to person 3 Yes (25.6%), No (74.4%) 
Moneyin1 Money/gifts/banquet received from person 
1 
Yes (30.0%), No (70.0%) 
Moneyin2 Money/gifts/banquet received from person 
2 
Yes (25.5%), No (74.5%) 
Moneyin3 Money/gifts/banquet received from person 
3 
Yes (24.2%), No (75.8%) 
   
Individual characteristics   
Education1 Relation person 1’s years of schooling Mean(9.96), Deviation(3.14) 
Education2 Relation person 2’s years of schooling Mean(9..63), Deviation(3.20) 
Education3 Relation person 3’s years of schooling Mean(9.58), Deviation(3.22) 
Residential_place1 Relation person 1’s residential place 
Countryside (16.77%), Same community (33.86%), Same city (29.48%), 
Same province (9.70%), Other province (10.19%) 
Residential_place2 Relation person 2’s residential place 
Countryside (18.66%), Same community (30.97%), Same city (28.80%), 
Same province (9.11%), Other province (12.47%) 
Residential_place3 Relation person 3’s residential place 
Countryside (17.99%), Same community (29.79%), Same city (29.95%), 
Same province (9.74%), Other province (12.54%) 
Data source: RUMiC 2009. 
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Table 3 
The effect of social network on the monthly income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 lincome lincome lincome lincome lincome lincome lincome lincome 
persons    0.000809*   0.00105** 0.000820 
    (0.000447)   (0.000468) (0.000716) 
relatives     -0.00105    
     (0.00128)    
friends     0.00190***    
     (0.000523)    
helpers      0.00492*   
      (0.00226)   
age 0.0507*** 0.0407*** 0.0399*** 0.0399*** 0.0402*** 0.0403*** 0.0276*** 0.0454*** 
 (0.00625) (0.00572) (0.00561) (0.00560) (0.00558) (0.00563) (0.00784) (0.00793) 
age2 -0.000753*** -0.000632*** -0.000608*** -0.000606*** -0.000611*** -0.000611*** -0.000433*** -0.000676*** 
 (0.0000853) (0.0000774) (0.0000751) (0.0000750) (0.0000747) (0.0000752) (0.000105) (0.000104) 
tenure 0.0415*** 0.0347*** 0.0325*** 0.0326*** 0.0328*** 0.0325*** 0.0279*** 0.0331*** 
 (0.00618) (0.00582) (0.00593) (0.00591) (0.00594) (0.00590) (0.00726) (0.00901) 
tenure2 -0.00113*** -0.000906*** -0.000908*** -0.000917*** -0.000924*** -0.000914*** -0.000556 -0.00106*** 
 (0.000272) (0.000250) (0.000249) (0.000248) (0.000250) (0.000248) (0.000377) (0.000333) 
experience 0.00175 0.00490** 0.00406* 0.00404* 0.00403* 0.00401* 0.00297 0.00543* 
 (0.00229) (0.00216) (0.00208) (0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00207) (0.00209) (0.00327) 
married 0.00335 0.00486 0.000761 0.00350 0.00787 0.00418 0.00619 -0.00203 
 (0.0253) (0.0238) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0290) (0.0349) 
gender 0.159*** 0.155*** 0.120*** 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.124*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0180) (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0250) (0.0303) 
training 0.0801*** 0.0660*** 0.0673*** 0.0658*** 0.0650*** 0.0644*** 0.0223 0.0995*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0183) (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0210) (0.0268) 
health 0.0499*** 0.0362*** 0.0382*** 0.0378*** 0.0382*** 0.0385*** 0.0273** 0.0412** 
 (0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0133) (0.0175) 
education 0.0304*** 0.0243*** 0.0212*** 0.0206*** 0.0204*** 0.0206*** 0.0137** 0.0246*** 
 (0.00415) (0.00400) (0.00419) (0.00424) (0.00421) (0.00419) (0.00471) (0.00649) 
worktime 0.00318*** 0.00416*** 0.00382*** 0.00384*** 0.00384*** 0.00379*** 0.0000628 0.00542*** 
 (0.000957) (0.00101) (0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00123) (0.00123) (0.000805) (0.00187) 
catering  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
accommodation  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
city  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
occupation   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
constant 5.601*** 5.898*** 5.772*** 5.762*** 5.760*** 5.758*** 6.387*** 5.430*** 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.163) (0.182) 
Observations 2807 2807 2807 2807 2807 2807 1233 1574 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.266 0.300 0.301 0.303 0.302 0.398 0.298 
Notes: 1. “Yes” represents that dummy variables catering, accommodation, city and occupation are controlled. 
2. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation. ***statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; 
*statistically significant at the 10% level; 
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Table 4 
The effect of intra-network education spillover effect on the monthly income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lincome lincome lincome lincome lincome 
gap1 0.00671**     
 (0.00280)     
gap2  0.00817**    
  (0.00376)    
gap3   0.0146***   
   (0.00519)   
average1    0.0152**  
    (0.00588)  
average2     0.0209** 
     (0.0104) 
age 0.0383*** 0.0376*** 0.0268*** 0.0258*** 0.0268*** 
 (0.00569) (0.00708) (0.00910) (0.00919) (0.00909) 
age2 -0.000583*** -0.000560*** -0.000427*** -0.000410*** -0.000420*** 
 (0.0000759) (0.0000940) (0.000120) (0.000121) (0.000120) 
tenure 0.0332*** 0.0322*** 0.0417*** 0.0398*** 0.0402*** 
 (0.00586) (0.00843) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0105) 
tenure2 -0.000980*** -0.000886** -0.00119*** -0.00111** -0.00108** 
 (0.000246) (0.000375) (0.000440) (0.000439) (0.000433) 
experience 0.00477** 0.00526* 0.00836** 0.00806** 0.00782** 
 (0.00213) (0.00274) (0.00334) (0.00345) (0.00343) 
married 0.000195 -0.0145 -0.0206 -0.0164 -0.0234 
 (0.0235) (0.0292) (0.0370) (0.0377) (0.0376) 
gender 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.0868** 0.0891** 0.0960*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0278) (0.0331) (0.0338) (0.0339) 
training 0.0701*** 0.0786*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0219) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0270) 
health 0.0352*** 0.0358** 0.0236 0.0281 0.0296 
 (0.0116) (0.0142) (0.0171) (0.0176) (0.0175) 
education 0.0259*** 0.0269*** 0.0317*** 0.0321*** 0.0359*** 
 (0.00437) (0.00552) (0.00805) (0.00779) (0.00817) 
worktime 0.00367*** 0.00463*** 0.00618*** 0.00633*** 0.00600*** 
 (0.00123) (0.00170) (0.00230) (0.00231) (0.00229) 
catering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
accommodation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
city Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
constant 5.771*** 5.710*** 5.731*** 5.699*** 5.705*** 
 (0.129) (0.166) (0.216) (0.215) (0.209) 
Observations 2682 1739 1143 1116 1137 
Adjusted R2 0.312 0.296 0.310 0.307 0.304 
Notes: 1. “Yes” represents that dummy variables catering, accommodation, city and occupation are controlled; 
2. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation, ***statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; 
*statistically significant at the 10% level; 
3. There existing some missing observations about migrant’s relation persons’ education, and the number of missing observations varies when 
we use the education level to replace years of schooling. So the observations in column (4) slightly differ with those in column (5), and this difference 
doesn’t affect out results.  
30 
 
Table 5 
Gender difference of intra-network education spillover effect 
 (1)Male (2)Female (3)Male (4)Female (5)Male (6)Female (7)Male (8)Female 
 lincome lincome lincome lincome lincome lincome lincome lincome 
gap1 0.00739** 0.00582       
 (0.00358) (0.00425)       
gap2   0.00954* -0.00372     
   (0.00507) (0.00589)     
gap3     0.0166** 0.00712   
     (0.00707) (0.00640)   
average1       0.0164** 0.00158 
       (0.00734) (0.00941) 
constant 5.925*** 5.688*** 5.846*** 5.677*** 5.747*** 5.700*** 5.740*** 5.711*** 
 (0.163) (0.257) (0.211) (0.294) (0.292) (0.345) (0.285) (0.352) 
Observations 1763 919 1170 569 797 346 782 334 
Adjusted R2 0.283 0.373 0.270 0.378 0.289 0.465 0.283 0.464 
Notes: 1. Only key variables are reported here, same other control variables in table 4 are controlled but not present due to the space limitation; 
2. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation, ***statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; 
*statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 6 
Results propensity score matching 
 gap1>0 gap2>0 gap3>0 
 ATT value t-value ATT value t-value ATT value t-value 
Nearest neighbor 
matching 
0.0722 2.95 0.0601 2.00 0.119 3.17 
Radius matching 0.0766 3.24 0.0403 1.37 0.0976 2.78 
Kernel matching 0.0766 3.25 0.0396 1.29 0.106 2.88 
Notes: 1.ATT values for control group not presented here due to the space limitation; 
2. t-value>1.96 means the results are significant at the level 5%. 
 
Table 7  
Results of IV estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lincome lincome lincome 
gap1 0.0703*   
 (0.0390)   
education 0.0615**   
 (0.0247)   
gap2  0.0986**  
  (0.0454)  
education  0.0780***  
  (0.0288)  
gap3   0.103* 
   (0.0545) 
education   0.0780** 
   (0.0320) 
F statistics of first stage 18.61 12.02 16.54 
sargan statistics 0.15 0.85 0.43 
Observations 2682 1739 1143 
Notes: 1.The other control variables in table 4 are controlled but not presented due to space limitation. 
2. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation, ***statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; 
*statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 8  
Spillover effect of relatives and non-relatives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 relatives non-relatives relatives non-relatives relatives non-relatives 
gap1 0.00505 0.00749*     
 (0.00416) (0.00391)     
gap2   -0.00528 0.0154***   
   (0.00695) (0.00452)   
gap3     0.0142 0.0154*** 
     (0.0110) (0.00554) 
constant 5.646*** 5.932*** 6.133*** 5.672*** 5.501*** 5.816*** 
 (0.248) (0.146) (0.368) (0.192) (0.505) (0.216) 
Observations 894 1788 535 1204 310 833 
Adjusted R2 0.314 0.351 0.325 0.364 0.356 0.406 
Notes: 1. The other control variables in table 4 are controlled but not presented due to the space limitation; 
2. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation, ***statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; 
*statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 9 
Spillover effect categorized by different type of helps received from the relation persons 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 psychological help financial help psychological help financial help psychological help financial help 
gap1 0.00724** 0.00883*     
 (0.00337) (0.00484)     
gap2   0.00898** 0.00403   
   (0.00401) (0.00725)   
gap3     0.01000** 0.0191 
     (0.00481) (0.0105) 
constant 5.739*** 5.850*** 5.693*** 5.809*** 5.823*** 5.943*** 
 (0.157) (0.232) (0.184) (0.325) (0.233) (0.445) 
Observations 1871 852 1287 428 809 244 
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.312 0.355 0.261 0.389 0.351 
Notes: 1. The other control variables in table 4 are controlled but not presented due to the space limitation; 
2. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation, ***statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; 
*statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 10 
Spillover effect categorized by living distance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 live near live far away live near live far away live near live far away 
gap1 0.00763** 0.00846     
 (0.00379) (0.00649)     
gap2   0.00517 0.00471   
   (0.00557) (0.00692)   
gap3     0.0231*** 0.00744 
     (0.00852) (0.00697) 
constant 5.894*** 5.166*** 5.778*** 5.520*** 5.769*** 5.443*** 
 (0.155) (0.335) (0.213) (0.361) (0.289) (0.369) 
Observations 1705 977 1048 490 681 462 
Adjusted R2 0.333 0.355 0.316 0.315 0.330 0.331 
Notes: 1.The other control variables in table 4 are controlled but not presented due to the space limitation; 
2. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation, ***statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; 
*statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 11 
Spillover effect categorized by contact frequency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 frequently not frequently frequently not frequently frequently not frequently 
gap1 0.00623* 0.00895     
 (0.00332) (0.00872)     
gap2   0.00984** 0.0210   
   (0.00433) (0.0155)   
gap3     0.0190*** 0.0270** 
     (0.00627) (0.0132) 
constant 6.084*** 5.713*** 5.778*** 6.005*** 6.087*** 5.511*** 
 (0.145) (0.525) (0.213) (0.192) (0.294) (0.377) 
Observations 2495 187 1610 129 1022 121 
Adjusted R2 0.428 0.364 0.316 0.445 0.459 0.330 
Notes: 1.The other control variables in table 4 are controlled but not presented due to the space limitations; 
2. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviation, ***statistically significant at the 1% level; ** statistically significant at the 5% level; 
*statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 
